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"VW-BUS IN TOP-
CONDITION, NO 
ACCIDENTS, FEW 
KILOMETERS..." 
 
Trust problem ? 
Süddeutsche Zeitung vom 19.1.2007 “Abgezockt im 
Internet. Kein Betrug mehr, sondern schon 
Geschäftsmodell.” (Probably invented example.) 
Bad luck if it happens after payment! 
FOTO: ISTOCKPHOTO  Süddeutsche Zeitung 
vom 19.1.2007 
Japan 
Hilfe, mein Pudel ist ein Schaf  
Würden Sie den Unterschied zwischen einem Schaf und einem Pudel 
erkennen? Viele Japaner offensichtlich nicht: Eine Betrügerbande hat sich 
diese Unwissenheit jetzt zunutze gemacht.  
Von Beate Wild           Südd. Zeitung, 27.4.2007 
Help, my poodle is a 
sheep! Would you recognize 
the difference between a 
sheep and a poodle? 
According to German 
newspapers many Japanese 
people never came in contact 
with these animals. A criminal 
gang in Japan exploited the 
lack of knowledge and sold 
sheeps for poodles. Maiko 
Kawakami, Japanese actor, 
became a prominent victim of 
the fraudsters. 
Cooperation problem on 
anonymous markets  
•  Non-repeated interactions of anonymous actors 
•  Asymmetric information: Both, sellers and 
buyers have a trust problem 
•  Emergence of institutions to solve for trust 
problems 
•  Elements of the system are 1. payment rules, 2. 
the reputation and feedback system 
•  “Natural experiment” for the evolution of 
cooperation if the “shadow of the future” is 
replaced by reputation or “the shadow of the 
past” 
Two questions: 
 
1.Mixed evidence for the hypothesis of “a  
premium for reputation”. a) Is there an 
effect of reputation on price? b) Is the 
effect larger for used products? 
   One needs homogeneous goods to test for 
this hypothesis. Also, we have a new and 
large data set collected from German 
eBay auctions: 13044 mobile phone offers. 
 
2. High participation in the feedback system 
is a collective good. There is the problem 
of the erosion of the feedback system by 
freeriding. Why does a large proportion of 
actors cooperate? Is there altruistic or 
strategic reciprocity? 
   Data: 177561 transactions of DVDs, eBay 
Germany.  
How to solve a seller’s trust problem? 
 
Constraint: In auctions, seller normally 
cannot choose their interaction partner 
Sellers protect themselves by choosing a 
trust game with the buyer in the role of a 
trustor and the seller in the role of a 
trustee. Payment rule: cash in advance or 
cash on delivery.  
Choice of institution such that a seller has 
the “first mover advantage”  
Mode of payment Number   Per cent Symmetric/ 
asymmetric 
Rank order 
of asymmetry 
in favour of 
seller 
Reputation 
arithmet.  
mean 
(Median) 
Payment in advance     47   25.1 asymmetr. 
in favour of 
seller 
4 22.04 
 (6.0) 
Cash on delivery   131   70.1 asymmetr. 
in favour of 
seller 
3   9.87 
 (5.0) 
Buyer collects on 
delivery of cash 
payment 
     6     3.2 symmetric 2   1.67 
 (0.0) 
Seller delivers on 
receipt of cash 
payment 
     2     1.1 symmetric 1     - 
Seller delivers by 
mail.  Buyer pays to 
account 
     1     0.5 asymmetr. 
in favour of 
buyer 
0     - 
Credit card      0     0 - -     - 
Total  187 100.0 
Seller determines mode of payment and the higher the reputation, the 
more she can exert her power to determine favourable payment 
conditions (data from Ricardo-CH) 
Simplified game structure:   
Two problems:  
1.  Selection problem: Buyer has to choose seller. 
C = Buyer chooses seller/ seller accepts buyer 
D = Buyer rejects seller’s offer 
2.  Transaction problem: Seller has to exchange good for money. 
C = Buyer pays in advance/ seller delivers a quality good. 
D = Buyer refuses to pay/ seller does not deliver the product. 
Seller determines type of game: Sequential PD with buyer’s move first 
(“second-mover advantage”).  
To simplify, remove buyer’s option to defect after selection of seller:  
 Trust Game  
Combination of: (1) selection problem and (2) transaction problem 
  New products Used products 
Log positive ratings 1.091 *** 1.110 *** 1.253 *** 0.874 *** 
Log negative ratings -1.370 * -1.919 *** -2.469 *** -2.661 *** 
Previous interaction (0/1) -2.394   5.970 *** 
Starting price 0.040 *** 0.138 *** 
Auction duration (in days) 0.202   -0.134 
Calendar time (centered) -0.262 *** -0.230 *** 
No. of bidders 0.636 *** 1.540 *** 
Competition (other offers) -0.097 *** -0.091 *** 
Auction ended on a Sunday -4.325 *** -0.029 
Picture 3.245 * 4.243 ** 
Listing with thumbnail 2.175 *** 3.125 *** 
Listing in bold 0.894   3.191 ** 
Log description length 0.808 *** 2.835 *** 
Product dummy variables [...] *** [...] *** [...] *** [...] *** 
Constant 235.179 *** 225.789 *** 215.054 *** 173.702 *** 
Adj. R-squared 0.817   0.843   0.757   0.786   
No. of cases 4875   4875   8169   8169   
Effect of Reputation on Prices  
Notes: German eBay mobile phone market, 1.12.04 – 7.1.05; Dependent variable: Selling price 
(EUR). * p<.05, ** p<.0, *** p<.001 (adjusted for clustering on sellers).  
Effect of Reputation on Prices  
Notes: German eBay mobile phone market, 1.12.04 – 7.1.05; Dependent variable: Selling price 
(EUR). * p<.05, ** p<.0, *** p<.001 (adjusted for clustering on sellers).  
New products Used products 
Log positive ratings 1.017 *** 1.244 *** 1.316 *** 1.197 *** 
Log negative ratings -1.216 * -2.042 *** -2.482 *** -3.027 *** 
Previous interaction (0/1) -2.968 * 2.518 * 
Log buyer score -1.017 *** -0.985 *** 
Starting price 0.0125 * 0.0580 *** 
Auction duration (days) -0.0096 -0.142 
Calendar time (centered) -0.305 *** -0.252 *** 
Calendar time squared 0.0225 *** 0.0256 *** 
Competition (other offers) -0.117 *** -0.0867 *** 
Product picture 3.705 ** 4.818 ** 
Listing with thumbnail 2.251 *** 4.053 *** 
Bold listing 1.070 2.833 ** 
Log description length 1.048 *** 2.740 *** 
Constant 236.4 *** 235.5 *** 215.1 *** 193.2 *** 
Product dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.810 0.838 0.758 0.781 
Observations 5096 5096 8306 8306 
•  Giving feedback: Freerider problem 
•  Erosion of rating system? 
•  Similar to “voting paradox” 
Why do actors contribute to the collective 
good? 
•  Low cost decision 
•  Reciprocity norm (altruistic reciprocity) 
•  Strategic decision 
  Sellers Buyers 
Buyer first 1.706 *** (0.112) 
Seller first 0.616 *** (0.011) 
Buyer on seller's list -0.359 *** (0.070) 0.237 *** (0.055) 
Seller on buyer's list -0.016 (0.096) -0.566 *** (0.063) 
Seller reputation score 0.366 *** (0.072) -0.060 *** (0.008) 
Seller reputation squared -0.041 *** (0.007) 0.007 *** (0.001) 
Power seller 0.193 (0.161) -0.023 (0.016) 
Seller ID Verified 0.318 * (0.157) 0.018 (0.016) 
Seller buying activity (0/1) 0.264 *** (0.067) 
Buyer reputation score 0.094 *** (0.012) 0.285 *** (0.017) 
Buyer reputation squared -0.010 *** (0.001) -0.026 *** (0.002) 
Buyer ID Verified 0.040 (0.045) 0.319 *** (0.046) 
Buyer selling activity (0/1) 0.212 *** (0.035) 
Price 0.004 (0.002) -0.000 (0.000) 
"New" in title 0.021 (0.052) -0.054 *** (0.011) 
Picture 0.021 (0.102) 0.045 ** (0.014) 
No. of cases 152939     152939     
No. of clusters 27421     88951     
Proportional Hazards Models for Submitting (Positive) Feedback  
Notes: German eBay DVD market, 1.12.04 – 7.1.05; Bootstrap SE in parentheses 
Proportional Hazards Models for Submitting (Positive) Feedback  
Notes: German eBay DVD market, 1.12.04 – 7.1.05; Bootstrap SE in parentheses 
(adjusted for clustering); All reputation scores in logarithms; * p<.05, ** p<.0, *** p<.001  
Sellers Buyers 
Other rated first 2.018 *** (0.115) 0.720 *** (0.00868) 
Rating from previous interaction -0.281 *** (0.0755) -0.468 *** (0.0331) 
Hybrid actor 0.177 ** (0.0582) 0.187 *** (0.0196) 
Positive seller score (log) 0.0481 ** (0.0155) 0.0761 *** (0.00357) 
Negative seller score (log) -0.201 *** (0.0269) -0.0912 *** (0.00499) 
Seller has Verified Identity 0.211 * (0.0867) 0.116 *** (0.0141) 
Seller has Me-Page 0.165 ** (0.0629) 0.0282 * (0.0127) 
Positive buyer score (log) 0.0383 *** (0.00427) 0.139 *** (0.00368) 
Negative buyer score (log) -0.0902 *** (0.0112) -0.252 *** (0.0102) 
Buyer has Verified Identity -0.0427 (0.0501) 0.190 *** (0.0374) 
Buyer has Me-Page -0.0945 *** (0.0260) 0.0434 (0.0284) 
Selling price -0.00164 (0.00128) -0.000382 (0.000312) 
Description length (log) -0.00672 (0.0162) -0.0203 *** (0.00303) 
Listing as new -0.107 (0.0589) 0.00595 (0.00924) 
Listing in bold -0.202 (0.136) -0.165 ** (0.0559) 
Payment is PayPal or credit card 0.0792 (0.0506) 0.0203 (0.0107) 
Observations (Clusters) 177561 (29816) 177561 (99139) 
Events 146693 146300 
Empirical analysis of auction data shows: 
1.  Buyers pay for reputation („premium“ on reputation).  
2.  Negative reputation has a strong impact if there is high 
uncertainty. 
3.  Sellers have an incentive to invest in reputation, i.e. to 
behave cooperatively. 
4.  Sellers choose payment mode („second mover 
advantage“) 
5.  Reciprocity supports feedback 
6.  Simple institutional setting to ensure cooperation! 
Emergence of institutional rules: 1. Payment, 2. 
shipping the product in quality advertised, 3. buyer‘s 
feedback, 4. seller‘s feedback. 
7.  Problems: Strategic use of the rating system! Inflation 
of positive ratings. Building up fake reputations! 
   •  Given a) transparency (all actors have access to the rating histories), b) high participation in 
rating, and c) the traded goods or services are 
“inspection goods” a decentralized reputation 
system is a very simple and effective 
mechanism to achieve cooperation. 
•  Diffusion of Reputation mechanisms. For 
example, new products, books, second-hand 
car dealers, lawyers, dentists, 
cardiologists,teachers, professors 
(www.meinprof.de) ... ►„Reputation Society“? 
 
